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Abstract 
Arrow’s impossibility result not only had a profound influence on welfare 
economics but was, as this paper shows, also widely discussed in philosophy of 









Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility result had an enormous impact on welfare 
economics and finally led to a new area called “social choice theory” and the 
launching of a new scientific journal with the title Social Choice and Welfare. 
Arrow’s seminal work on the (non-)existence of a social welfare function also 
had a profound influence on philosophical writings about justice and equity. 
The list of these contributions is long. Only a few should be mentioned here. 
First and foremost in my enumeration is John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice 
(1971), Thomas Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other (1998) and Amartya 
Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009), but reference also should be given to 
contributions by Stephen Strasnick (1976), Patrick Suppes (1966), Lars-Gunnar 
Svenson (1977), and Larry Temkin (1993), among many others. However, as the 
title of this paper indicates, I shall not review this strand of literature any 
further, all the more so because that path has been well explored during the 
last three or four decades.  
What I wish to do in what follows is, first, to take a closer look at another area 
within philosophy, namely a discussion that had its beginning in Thomas Kuhn’s 
famous statement that there is no neutral algorithm for theory choice and, 
second - at first sight rather surprising, for me at least - a discussion of the 
relevance of Arrow’s theorem in engineering, where the issue is how to make 
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rational choices among alternative design options. This short summary already 
indicates the structure of sections 2 and 3 of this paper. A few concluding 
remarks are gathered in section 4. 
2. Kuhn’s no neutral algorithm thesis 
In order to evaluate and compare alternative theories adequately, particularly 
in the natural sciences, Thomas Kuhn (1962, 1974, 1977) argued that theory 
choice should be based on at least five epistemic criteria or values, namely 
accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. “Together with others 
of much the same sort, they provide the shared basis for theory choice” (Kuhn 
1977, p. 357). However, different scientists can create more than one ranking 
of rival theories even if they agree that the evaluation should be done solely in 
relation to Kuhn’s (1977, p. 358) criteria: “When scientists must choose 
between competing theories, two men fully committed to the same list of 
criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions. Perhaps they 
interpret simplicity differently or have different convictions about the range of 
fields within which the consistency criterion must be met. Or perhaps they 
agree about these matters but differ about the relative weights to be accorded 
to these or to other criteria when several are deployed together.” 
Kuhn argues that philosophers of science often have neglected the subjective 
elements that enter into theory choice. Algorithmic decision procedures that 
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attempt to solve the theory choice problem often presuppose “that individual 
criteria of choice can be unambiguously stated and also that, if more than one 
proves relevant, an appropriate weight function is at hand for their joint 
application” (Kuhn 1977, p. 359). The subjective component, “idiosyncratic 
factors dependent on individual biography and personality”, finally led Kuhn 
(1977, p. 361) to the conviction that there is “no neutral algorithm for theory 
choice”, or, because of the role that subjective factors play in the evaluation 
procedure, that there is no unique algorithm, but several algorithms instead. 
It was precisely this view (or interpretation of Kuhn’s position) that led Samir 
Okasha (2011) to resort to instruments from social choice theory and to 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem in particular. Okasha interprets Kuhn’s five 
criteria from above as “individuals” who have their own preference ranking 
over alternative theories. So if Ri is the preference order of individual i over a 
finite set of alternatives X or, in the current context, the rank-order of criterion 
i over a set of given theories, then the issue is to aggregate any logically 
possible profile of orderings R1, R2, …, Rn into a unique ordering over X, which is 
exactly how Arrow set up the social choice problem. 
One should pause for a moment in order to become aware of the fact that on 
the path from Kuhn to Arrow, Okasha introduced a non-trivial twist. While 
Kuhn’s position was that no unique algorithm exists because of various 
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subjective components within the evaluation procedure so that several or even 
many algorithms may be available for choosing among alternative theories, 
Arrow’s impossibility result that Okasha invokes says that no algorithm at all 
exists that meets certain standards of how an aggregation of preferences 
should proceed. Okasha (2011, p.93) is, of course, well aware of this “fact” 
when he says that “where Kuhn saw an embarrassment of riches, Arrow tells us 
that there is nothing at all.” 
Once this twist in the interpretation of Kuhn’s position is accepted, the 
following statement by Okasha (2011, p. 94) makes sense: “Since the Arrow-
style impossibility result threatens the rationality of theory choice, and thus of 
science, it would be nice if there were a way out.” And very clearly, as welfare 
economists know, various possibilities have been suggested in the social choice 
literature and have fairly recently been the object of discussion, controversially 
of course, in the debate on theory choice by philosophers. Most of these 
proposals are closely related to Arrow’s conditions that the aggregation 
procedure should fulfil, namely full rationality of the overall preference 
relation, unrestricted domain, weak Paretian orderings, independence of 
irrelevant alternatives and the non-dictatorship requirement. Okasha discusses 
in particular a justification of the non-dictatorship condition since one may 
argue that among the criteria that Kuhn formulated, one of these might 
6 
 
perhaps have absolute priority. The author considers a possible dictatorship of 
accuracy, but finally dismisses that idea. He also asks whether, perhaps, 
unrestricted domain can be given up since tradeoffs or correlations may exist 
among several of Kuhn’s criteria. It may, for example, be the case that greater 
simplicity is reached by a sacrifice of accuracy so that an inverse relationship is 
possible between both values. Again, that path is dismissed by the author as a 
general way out of Arrow’s negative result. 
It is interesting to note that Okasha finally follows Sen’s (1977) proposal to 
enrich the informational basis of the aggregation procedure. Just to remind the 
reader, Sen suggested that the underlying utility information be broadened or 
enhanced. Then interpersonal comparisons of, for example, utility levels are 
made possible so that Rawls’s (1971) difference principle, which looks at 
individual positions under alternative social states, can reasonably be applied. 
One example that Okasha discusses at greater length in this context is the 
Bayesian approach to scientific inference. 
Consider several rival hypotheses Ti, i ∊ {1,…, m}, and a body of evidence E. The 
Bayesian approach assigns two scores to each theory Ti. The first is the prior 
probability P(Ti), and the second is the conditional likelihood P(E∣Ti).  Various 
ways of combining these two criteria into a decision rule are possible. 
Bayesians argue that one should multiply the prior by the conditional 
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likelihood, namely to consider the quantity P(Ti) ⨯ P(E∣Ti). Both P(Ti) and P(E∣Ti) 
imply a ranking of theories and thus constitute a “preference” profile. The 
problem of deriving an overall ranking of theories as a function of these two 
orderings is an example of the aggregation problem. Okasha speaks in this 
context of a Bayesian theory choice “functional” and refers to Sen’s (1970, 
1977) concept of a social welfare functional. The Bayesian choice functional 
violates two of Arrow’s conditions, namely unrestricted domain and the 
requirement of ordinal non-comparability. The Bayesian function is defined on 
the unit interval [0, 1] with the restriction that the sum of prior probabilities 
with respect to rival hypotheses (theories) be smaller than or equal to 1. What 
is more important, this function assigns numbers, namely probabilities that are 
absolutely measurable. Okasha argues that the fact that more than ordinal 
non-comparable information is being used is the primary reason why the 
Bayesian function is able to satisfy the other Arrovian requirements and thus 
generate a possibility result and, therefore, an escape route. 
Jacob Stegenga (2015, pp. 273-274) finds this escape route to a Bayesian theory 
choice algorithm to be mistaken: “…[T]he Bayesian criteria are (merely) post 
hoc measures of the goodness of theories, whereas most of the theoretical 
virtues commonly discussed (namely Kuhn’s five properties, W.G.) are 
substantive properties that constitute the goodness of theories.” Stegenga 
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(2015, p. 269) thinks that Sen’s suggestion cannot be fruitfully imported into 
theory choice since “in many cases, arguably most cases of interest in science, 
we only have ordinal and non-comparable measures of the support that a 
theoretical virtue provides to a theory.” This position undeniably is in sharp 
contrast to a recent proposal by Wulf Gaertner and Nicolas Wüthrich (2016) in 
which the informational basis is enriched in such a way that inter-criteria 
comparability is made possible within a cardinal setup. It is a grading method 
based on a common language of qualitative verdicts. 
As already indicated, the discussion in philosophy of science after Okasha’s 
article is very reminiscent of the debate in social choice theory after Arrow had 
published his path-breaking monograph on collective choice in 1951. As we will 
see shortly, it is very similar to a discussion of optimal design decisions in the 
engineering profession. 
Coming back very briefly to theory choice, Michael Morreau (2014, 2015) 
thinks that the assumption of unrestricted domain is inappropriate in relation 
to theory choice. He argues that the variety in the criterial orderings does not 
appear to be rich enough in order to warrant this requirement; he gives several 
examples from “toy science” and real science. Marcel Weber (2011), in contrast 
to Okasha, believes that the non-dictatorship condition should be abandoned 
in the case of theory choice. Fruitfulness in particular should be considered as a 
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dictatorial criterion among the epistemic values. Finally, Davide Rizza (2014, p. 
1852)) thinks that Arrow’s impossibility result has no relevance for theory 
choice as soon as one exploits the “sequencing or betweenness information” 
that is contained in an ordinal profile. Here, Rizza refers to Don Saari (1995) 
who, in various publications, has been arguing for positional methods, the 
Borda rank-order scheme in particular. Arguments in favor of this aggregation 
procedure which takes “ordinal distances” into account will reappear in the 
next section. 
 
3. From collective choice to engineering design 
There are two situations in engineering design for which the Arrow theorem 
may or, perhaps may not, apply. The first one sees a single engineer who has to 
evaluate alternative designs (a new body for a particular type of car, for 
example) according to a finite number of criteria. At the end of the day, this 
engineer is expected to come up with a rational decision that systematically 
orders the alternative conceivable designs. This is a multi-criteria decision 
problem. The second situation depicts a group of several engineers, “having 
different responsibilities for different features of the design – e.g., structural 
integrity energy efficiency, control system robustness, safety, effectiveness of 
user interface” (Franssen and Bucciarelli 2004) who will value design 
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alternatives differently, based on their individual preferences. This is a team 
decision problem. Both situations call for an aggregation procedure. 
Maarten Franssen (2005, p. 42) believes that Arrow’s theorem is very relevant 
and immediately applies to both kinds of decision problems: “The relevance to 
engineering design of the famous impossibility theorem for social choice … is 
receiving increased attention in the literature. Judgments on the importance of 
the theorem differ, however, depending partly on how the theorem is seen to 
apply to engineering design.” At the end of his article, Franssen (2005, p. 55) 
asserts that ”engineering design methodology could profit from the recognition 
of the structural identity of multi-criteria decision problems and social-choice 
problems in that it would provoke a closer look at the way ‘solutions’ to these 
problems are conceived in the area of social choice and would lead to research 
into the merits of these solutions for engineering design.” Franssen mentions in 
this context the majority rule and Kemeny’s method. 
Franssen discusses one aspect on which social decisions and multi-criteria 
decision-making may differ. In collective decisions, all voters are treated 
equally (the anonymity condition), while in multi-criteria decision-making “the 
case where all criteria are considered to be of equal importance would rather 
be the exception” (Franssen 2005, p. 45). It seems, however, that such unequal 
treatment can be incorporated easily into the Arrovian setup by counting a 
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particular criterion more often than others or, perhaps even better, by 
introducing an additional criterion that is closely related in importance or 
functioning to the first one. The latter suggestion would avoid the issue of 
weighting potential criteria differently. 
Michael Scott and Erik Antonsson (1999) argue that Arrow’s negative result 
does not apply to the multi-criteria engineering design problem. “Engineering 
variables are almost always ordered on an external scale, and preferences for 
engineering requirements are commonly single-peaked around an ideal target. 
Indeed, nearly all engineering requirements are of one of three forms: less is 
better, more is better, or closer to a particular target is better” (Scott and 
Antonsson 1999, p. 224). This may be true in a variety of cases, but what 
happens when some criteria follow the dictum of “smaller better than larger”, 
while others follow the maxim that “larger is to be preferred to smaller”? Table 
1 depicts such a case (Gaertner 2016). Four alternatives characterized by their 
(increasing) power are available. The criteria are weight, power to weight and 
cost. While criteria 1 and 3 follow the former “philosophy”, criterion 2 follows 
the latter. According to criterion 1, we obtain that a is better than b, which is 
better than c, which again is better than d. Criterion 2 prefers c to b, b to d, and 
d to a; and criterion 3 finds d best, then a, which is followed by b, with c being 
last. These rankings, taken separately, are very intuitive. Taken together, they 
12 
 
cannot be arranged in a single-peaked fashion. Actually, two of the triple-
combinations display a latin-square structure, namely (a, b, d) and (a, c, d). This 
shows that Scott and Antonsson’s argumentation may not lead too far as a 
general way out of the Arrovian dilemma. 
                                        Table 1 about here 
 
The authors assert that a practical difference exists between social choice and 
engineering design. Designs may have to fulfil constraints. “A maximum stress 
indicates the point at which a design breaks and fails; government regulations 
must be fulfilled or a design is not allowed on the market” (Scott and 
Antonsson 1999, p. 224). But do these constraints, we have to ask, necessarily 
lead to a structured set of preferences, in the sense of single-peakedness or 
any of the other domain conditions proposed in social choice theory (Gaertner 
2001, 2009)? 
Contrary to Weber’s (2011) argument in philosophy of science, Scott and 
Antonsson do not think that non-dictatorship should be abandoned as a 
requirement in engineering design. “Dictatorship by one evaluation criterion is 
not a rational solution.…  Some engineering cultures may appear to have a 
dictator in the form of a single decision-maker, perhaps a manager with 
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ultimate responsibility for all decisions; however, decisions will still be made by 
considering several criteria” (Scott and Antonsson 1999, p. 221). 
While Scott and Antonsson refer, as we have seen, to the fulfilment of a 
particular structure that criteria may follow when evaluating alternative design 
options, Clive Dym et al. (2002) provide arguments for a particular aggregation 
mechanism that they consider as appropriate in the judgment of designs. The 
authors call this scheme “pairwise comparison chart”. It is equivalent, as they 
show, to the Borda count, which violates Arrow’s independence condition. The 
reason for this equivalence is that the vector of ranks according to the Borda 
rule is the “aggregated version of pairwise voting” (Saari 1995, p. 156). To 
substantiate their proposal, Scott and Antosson (2002, p. 238) argue that “from 
a practical standpoint, both designers and teachers of design have found that 
pairwise comparisons appear to work well by focusing their attention, and by 
bringing order to large numbers of seemingly disparate objectives, attributes, 
or data points. In addition, these rankings often produce good designs.” So 
again, we find a similarity in reasoning between theory choice and decisions in 
engineering design, two fields that do not seem to know one another, as one 





4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have tried to show that Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility result, 
which shook up major parts of welfare economics, also had a larger impact on 
fields of science that are quite far away from economics proper. At first sight, 
one would not have expected that Arrow’s negative result would ever be 
discussed seriously in the philosophy of science and in engineering. But a 
second thought makes clear that the “Arrow problem” also manifests itself in 
those areas. It is interesting to see that both in the philosophy of science and in 
engineering attempts were made to demonstrate that Arrow’s findings do not 
seem to have any deeper relevance for other fields – as there was in welfare 
economics after the appearance of his Social Choice and Individual Values. Paul 
Samuelson (1967, p. 42), for example, argued that Arrow’s result is much more 
a contribution to the discipline of mathematical politics than to the theory of 
welfare economics. 
It is also interesting to witness stunning parallels in the argumentation that 
emerged outside economics. In both fields that we were looking at, one can 
find arguments to give up the unrestricted domain condition, in both areas one 
also encounters arguments in favor of violating the independence condition 
and for considering a Borda-type aggregation procedure. All of that debate 
shows how deep and profound Arrow’s seminal work on social choice is. To 
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refer to Samuelson (1967, pp. 41-42) again, “…I must admit that my vanity as 
an economist is gratified that one of the soldiers in our regiment should have 
made a contribution of universal interest”. 
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      a          300 1000 300 6300 
      b 330 1050 314 6600 
      c 350 1100 318 7000 
      d 400 1300 308 6200 
 
Table 1: A multi-criteria decision problem 
The three criteria “weight”, “power/weight” and “cost”, taken together, cannot 
be arranged in a single-peaked fashion. 
 
